Traveling in the Breakdown Lane A Principle of Resistance
for Hypertext
Stuart Moulthrop School of Communications Design University of
Baltimore mailto:%20samoulthrop@ubmail.ubalt.edu
This essay appeared in Mosaic 28/4 (1995), pp.
55-77
On-line talent wars will occur: [there will be] a need to keep the
lines clean and open.... Above all, perhaps, the author's freedom to take a
story anywhere at any time and in as many directions as he or she wishes...
becomes the obligation to do so: in the end it can be paralyzing... One will
feel the need, even while using these vast networks and principles of
randomness and expansive story lines, to struggle against them, just as one
now struggles against the linear constraints of the printed book.
--Robert Coover, cited in Landow (112)
In the mid-eighties, more than two decades after Theodor Holm Nelson first
broached the subject of "hypertext" or "non-sequential writing" (0/2), computer
scientists finally set to work implementing this concept on a broad scale. One
of the outcomes of this activity is the World Wide Web, an international system
for publishing linked electronic discourse which realizes many aspects of
Nelson's great project (Dougherty and Koman 9-13). With tens of thousands of
documents and millions of links in place, and more added daily, the World Wide
Web may be the most complex written artifact ever produced. As a practical
enterprise, not merely a theoretical invention, hypertext has undoubtedly
arrived.
As Robert Coover's speculations suggest, this arrival may have as much
relevance for fiction, history, and other forms of narrative culture as it does
for informatics --though culture workers may well share Coover's deep
skepticism. Responses so far have been mixed. After Coover declared "The End of
Books" in the New York Times Book Review in 1992, hypertext has turned up
with surprising frequency in literary discussion. Michiko Kakutani worries that
this technology spells the end of responsible writing ("Fiction?" B8), while
Nicholson Baker decries "hypertextual bouleversement" as a scare tactic for
terrorizing writers and publishers ("Infohighwaymen"). Other commentators have
been less agonized. Thomas Pynchon refers casually to "the do-it-yourself
hypertextualist" in one of his rare prefaces ("Introduction" xv). Richard Lanham
and Jay David Bolter both argue that hypertext merely carries on the ancient
project of literacy. For them, the transition from books to electronic webs
carries the force of historical necessity. Commenting on Bolter's Writing
Space, Brian Eno calls Bolter "the new Gutenberg" (12). But electronic
culture also has its radical wing --for instance, the "media philosophers" Mark
Taylor and Esa Saarinen, for whom hypertext and networked telecommunications
represent a new intellectual order. "If you read books," they challenge,
"justify it" (Imagologies, "Superficiality" 11).
We are asked to understand the future in terms of putative revolutions,
ostensibly sweeping changes in the way we make and receive texts. We must now
justify what we have done for centuries. But how justifiable is this demand?
Where there are utopians there will also be dissidents. One character in Bruce
Sterling's recent novel Heavy Weather nicely puts the case against the
end of books, surveying the intellectual landscape of a post-apocalyptic 2030:
There were derelicts who could fit all their material possessions
in a paper bag, but they'd have a cheap laptop and some big chunk of [the
electronic Library of Congress], and they'd crouch under a culvert with it,
and peck around on it and fly around in it and hypertext it, and then they'd
come up with some pathetic, shattered, crank, loony, paranoid theory as to
what the hell had happened to them and their planet. . . . It almost beat
drugs for turning smart people into human wreckage. (74)
Whether or not one can justify reading books, or writing hypertexts, the
dubiousness of Sterling's narrator seems warranted. As Coover predicts,
hypertext confronts us with a troubling paradox. To the extent that it
represents any kind of innovation (and the claim is debatable), hypertext
departs from the hard line of monology, or what Roland Barthes called the
"classic" text (4). According to contemporary theory -- not just the
postmodernists and deconstructors, but also response theorists like Ingarden and
Iser and dialogists like Bakhtin -- conventional, pre-electronic writing has
been moving in this direction for a long time. Writing itself allows us to
capture the play of language in artefactual form, opening discourse to
reflection and thus to complication. The invention of printing amplified the
dissemination of writing, enabling the rise of literary markets and professional
authorship. Hypertext might indeed be seen as a direct extension of these trends
-- and yet this is where things start to turn paradoxical. Bolter's description
of our times as "the late age of print" (2) seems increasingly appropriate. This
is an era not of rupture but of transition. Print and its cultural influence are
far from dead, though the Gutenberg age has clearly reached a "late" or belated
phase. As Harold Bloom teaches, belatedness is an inherently ambiguous
condition. One is apt to find oneself "in the father without knowing him" (3),
or in some other parental or ancestral relationship, caught in a matrix of
tradition even as one seeks to rebel. This might explain Coover's insight, cited
in the epigraph, about the crossed purposes of hypertext. New technology
promises a swerve from the level line of literary tradition, a venture into
strange new worlds of polyvalent, polyvocal form. But this swerve is an ellipse,
not an escape. Our outward movement cannot overcome the pull of cultural
gravity; so there will be, at some point, a turnabout or return. We will not
struggle against the line without also struggling against the web. If hypertext
implies change, it also implies resistance. We will not understand either
hypertext or the larger cultural developments to which it articulates without
coming to terms with this resistance.
1. Resistance and refusal The desire for a resistance to hypertext is a
complicated matter. In other work, Nancy Kaplan and I have examined this effect
both as students of the text and teachers of literature. We have noted how the
threat of multiplicity in electronic writing tends to turn scholars back to
their books, while it confronts students, often more willing to experiment, with
a discursive hall of mirrors ("'They Became'" 233-37). One can choose to resist
hypertext the way some conservative critics do, by cleaving to the book and
ruling out any engagement with electronic technology. For instance, Alvin Kernan
proposes mass microfilming, instead of electronic encoding, to save books from
acidic decay, presumably because microfilm preserves the integrity of the book
as object (135-36). Words on microfilm stay firmly on the page; they are not
permutable as in electronic storage. Kernan's strategy seems misguided, since
microfilm is hardly more durable than paper over the long run. Sensible people
will see through this error readily enough. Some will of course opt for
half-measures like "electronic books" (Yankelovich 134), or "Expanded Books," as
the Voyager Company calls its products (Smith 8). But such "expansions" put us
on a slippery slope of innovation. Voyager's electronic libraries include
facilities for intertextual reference and annotation. Such devices blur and
collapse the boundaries between works, as hypertextual tools tend to do. It is a
very small step from the electronic book to true hypertext.
As Kaplan and I have observed in working with students, electronic writing
complicates the work of literary criticism. A critical project set up within a
hypertextual network becomes an intimate and integral part of the work it tries
to anatomize. In its root sense, "criticism" implies a separation of one
discourse from another; but in hypertext this primary agenda runs into
difficulties. If one chooses to work in hypertext, one has no clear defense
against the potential vastness of the network and its principle of multiplicity,
if not of "randomness." Resisting hypertext is by no means a simple matter. This
does not mean that Coover's prescription is impossible and that we can find no
balance between the demands of the network and those of the line. It does
suggest that any such accommodation must be deeply ambiguous, so much so that it
must turn back upon itself.
But before we can take these insights further, we must first specify what we
are resisting. Consider O.B. Hardison's breezy dismissal of hypertext in his
last work, Disappearing through the Skylight. Hardison speculates about a
hypertextual edition of Shakespeare's Tempest, presumably an electronic
compendium of source texts, commentaries, scholarly apparatus, and recorded
performances. Reflecting on this hypothetical object, Hardison wonders: "What
does hypertext do for -- or to --The Tempest? Unfortunately, the answer
is not as simple as it might seem to be in the abstract. The clear implication
of hypertext is that The Tempest is not a literary work to be enjoyed but
a heap of facts to be memorized or a puzzle to be solved or a mystery to be
explained... When we 'read' in this way, the play tends to disappear into the
hypertext like water in a sponge" (263-64). This seems a devastating critique,
until one realizes that it is aimed at the wrong target. Hardison proposes a
modest and uninteresting application of hypertext as typical of all work in the
medium -- but this is a serious mistake. His theoretical Tempest project
represents only incunabular hypertext, a hybrid production that is neither
electronic text nor book (nor indeed play) but an uneasy mixture of all these
things. In this view Shakespeare's play figures as butterfly in the electronic
web, a beautiful captive whose vital juices are sucked out by academic
predators. Not all hypertexts, however, put canonical art in such distress.
Throughout Hardison's discussion of electronic technology, his approach seems
distinctly pessimistic. Hardison believes that twentieth-century culture enacts
a "disappearance" in which nature (whatever that was) is steadily displaced by
artefacts. We no longer know things directly, we know only what our machines
tell us about them; which is to say, all we really know is our instrumentalities
(1). At the end of this process, Hardison predicts, our technologies themselves
will disappear in a final act of desertion. He cites a NASA researcher who
claims that with "the rapidity of technological evolution, it is reasonable to
expect that machines and their descendants only a few thousand years from now
might be invisible" (341). That is, advanced information devices will operate in
spheres or bandwidths beyond even our technologically extended senses. They will
no longer share our ontological level. According to this view, carbon-based life
is about to reach the end of its evolutionary program, or the boundaries of its
biosphere (for which see again Sterling's eco-crash novel, Heavy
Weather). The future lies up and out, in the machine-friendly environment of
space. The future is, therefore, non-human. Homo sapiens aliquantum will
be left behind as its erstwhile creations vanish over the "horizon of
invisibility," literally disappearing through the sky's light.
It seems logical enough, given this Darwinian fatalism, to regard a
development like hypertext as an eruption of noise within a precariously
balanced humanist system. But Hardison's narrative of disappearance is by no
means the only one applicable. A sharply different view may be found in the work
of Manuel De Landa, a technological historian who approaches his subject not
like Hardison, as an alienated humanist, but as a researcher well versed in the
military-scientific complex. This shift in perspective confers a crucial
difference in understanding. Being an insider, De Landa knows that the course of
technological development does not always run true. Seeking to consolidate its
own hegemony, militarized science creates powerful devices, from the conoidal
bullet to distributed computing networks. But such technologies quite often
develop in unintended ways, leading not to the consolidation of power but to its
unforeseen dissemination through ad hoc structures (guerrilla armies, or the
Internet). Given these possibilities for unforeseen change, De Landa does not
foresee a technological overcoming. Quite the reverse: in his view, interactive
computing techniques (including hypertext, which he cites specifically) open
"the machinic phylum" to human understanding. This is the direct antithesis of
Hardison's "disappearance." By using machines to complicate our representation
of nature, we make the world around us more richly and deeply present.
Interactive graphics enable us to discover the mathematics of chaos, enabling a
new understanding of physical structure. By the same token, interactive texts
might inspire an exfoliation of language and symbolic imagination. Coover's
"vast networks" might not be entirely sinister after all. De Landa sets an
important limit on techno-skepticism. "The task confronting us," he concludes,
"is to continue the positive tasks begun by hackers and visionary scientists as
embodied in their paradigm of human-machine interaction: the personal computer"
(228).
Seen from this perspective, hypertext constitutes a much more positive
development. But if we follow De Landa's upbeat reasoning, we must define the
field of hypertext differently than Hardison does. We must understand hypertext
as an encounter with the "machinic phylum." This means separating hypertext
incunabula, which do indeed seem to be questionable interventions into book
culture, from what we might call native hypertext: productions conceived and
developed entirely in the electronic idiom (see my "Informating Texts" 171).
Native hypertexts are creative and critical expressions of De Landa's "paradigm
of human-machine interaction." They use the interactive attributes of the
computer not to routinize understanding, but to augment our potential for
inference and expression. Hardison's nightmare of evolutionary bypass stems from
a common misprision of computing machines --the old cybernetic dream of
electronic brains, or the robot as a replacement for human workers. To a large
extent, these dreams are still cherished by proponents of expert systems and the
"strong" thesis in artificial intelligence (Penrose 17). But "strong" AI lies in
disgrace these days, overtaken by concerns with self-organizing rather than
linguistically determined systems, and by a commitment to augmentation rather
than autonomous mechanism. The recent interest in hypertext, both in the
sciences and the humanities, proceeds from this epistemic shift. H. Van Dyke
Parunak, a specialist on the mathematical properties of hypertext, has noted
that works in this form "offer semantic richness of data storage comparable to
that used in expert systems. In fact, a hyperdocument can be viewed as an expert
system whose inference engine is not a computer but a human being" (388). Or to
paraphrase, a hypertext is a sort of quasi-AI in which the "I" is you. To some
extent this principle is implicit even in Hardison's incunabular hypertext; but
it finds fullest expression only in texts that exist independent of book culture
-- in writings that come after "the end of books."
2. Constructive resistance As Coover's epigraph suggests, these native
hypertexts are largely (though not always) works of fiction -- and as we will
see, this definition should perhaps be understood in two senses: every
interactive fiction depends upon a fiction of interaction. In English, the idea
of interactive writing goes back at least as far as Sterne, whose Shandean
alter-ego claims that "writing, when properly managed... is but a different name
for conversation" (108). The application of computers to this eccentric
storytelling began with the earliest interactive operating systems. Will
Crowther and Don Woods of the Stanford Artificial Intelligence Laboratory
programmed the first text-exploration game, the illustrious Adventure, in 1976.
Adventure in turn launched a genre (Hardison 265). Its offspring, called "text
adventures," became a mainstay of the early computer game market, with several
titles, such as Robert Pinsky and Michael Campbell's Mindwheel and
Douglas Maretsky's A Mind Forever Voyaging, earning literary notice and
praise (see Pinsky).
When the current hypertext boom began in the mid-eighties, a number of
writers attempted to take interactive fiction beyond the deductive,
problem-solving milieu of the text adventures. Michael Joyce's afternoon: a
story (Eastgate Systems, 1990) introduced a major technical enhancement.
Joyce rejected the pragmatic commands found in adventure games ("Go North";
"Take gold"; "Hit troll with ax") in favor of "words that yield:" cues to
further development imbedded in the language of the story itself. In an
encounter with afternoon, the reader may find the sentence: "I want to
say I may have seen my son die this morning." If the reader selects the word
"son," she follows one narrative direction; if she chooses "die," "I want," or
some other set of words, she will go another way entirely. Eastgate Systems,
publishers of afternoon and Storyspace, the authoring system used to
create it, have developed a growing list of hypertext fictions and have just
launched the first hypertextual literary review.
Most works of the so-called Eastgate School resemble text adventures by being
chiefly verbal; but as word-based hypertext software has given way to more
complex "multimedia" tools, interactive fiction has begun to incorporate sounds
and images as well. Monica Moran's Ambulance (Electronic Hollywood, 1993)
brings the aesthetic of "adult comics" to electronic form. John McDaid's
Uncle Buddy's Phantom Funhouse (Eastgate Systems, 1993) presents the
reader with electronic sketchbooks, digital photo-montages, and audio tapes.
Greg Roach's Madness of Roland (Hyperbole, 1991) combines verbal text and
interactive video. None of these fictions make the literary experience
"disappear" in Hardison's terms. They do not operate upon any prior, printed
work. Though discernible stories do emerge in texts like afternoon, The
Ambulance, and Uncle Buddy's Phantom Funhouse -- and though, as we
will see, these stories manifest a curious similarity -- the narrative content
of the text does not depend upon some authoritative pre-text. Literature does
not vanish into the sponge-like electronic network, but rather precipitates on
each encounter.
Recognizing the importance of native hypertext might invalidate the harsh
resistance of Kernan, Hardison, and other mourners of the book. But dispensing
with one misguided form of resistance does not mean we might not find a better
one. Coover's injunction to "struggle" seems all the more urgent when applied to
native hypertext. In a form of writing that has effectively abandoned singular
sequence, Coover's worst fears of "randomness and expansive story lines" would
seem to be realized. Native hypertext appears particularly vulnerable to
elliptical and anarchic impulses. The problem for writers and readers alike is
both to resist and engage its dangerous energies. Coover suggests this
accommodation will not be reached without "on-line talent wars"; and indeed the
first salvos have already landed. In a recent issue of the Village Voice, Erik
Davis attacks the "precious literary experiments loved by Robert Coover." Davis
prefers a more open, improvisational writing space, one whose inhabitants can
"breed narratives of love and war, and jam like improv poets with their chat"
(43). This argument was anticipated some months earlier by Espen Aarseth, a
noted theorist of computer-based writing, who posted the following on the
Technoculture discussion:
I am not convinced
hypertext... is a particularly strong example of how "electronic textuality"
challenges tradidiological concepts such as readers, authors, freedom (of
print/publishing) etc. Significantly,
there is very little *free* [hypertext] fiction out there on the net (George
[Landow] making available his students' work seems to be the only exception):
the texts we discuss on tnc are written, sold and reviewed (and even
canonized) in a very traditional way. Furthermore, their writers are *authors*, with all
significant motor-parts intact... Hypertext fictions are novels, both
narratologically and sociologically. To find "the new writing" we must look
elsewhere; I would suggest towards UseNet, IRC, and the MUDs. (Aarseth)
According to their rhetoric at least, people like Davis and Aarseth are true
progressives, not lackeys of reaction. They have little in common with O.B.
Hardison beyond a relatively low opinion of hypertext. Aarseth and Davis
discount the current generation of electronic writing not because it destroys
the traditional experience of literature, but because it seems all too good at
maintaining it. This is a form of "struggle against" hypertext which Robert
Coover did not foresee.
Aarseth's counterexamples, "UseNet, IRC, and the MUDs," represent alternative
possibilities for electronic writing. They share the post-Gutenberg situation of
hypertext, though they differ in structure and concept. Unlike the native
hypertext discussed above, all three of Aarseth's writing environments operate
over the Internet, that vast, self-organizing assemblage of communications
systems which might prefigure Mr. Gore's "information superhighway." UseNet
supports thousands of "news groups" on which Internet users exchange technical
information, cultural opinions, art work, confessions, civic notices, political
debate, and even erotica (Krol 238). "IRC" stands for "Internet Relay Chat," a
computerized analogue of citizen's band radio in which users exchange typed
messages in something close to real time. For our purposes, the most important
of Aarseth's alternatives is the third, "the MUDs." The acronym MUD stands among
other things for "Multiple User Dimension." Hundreds of such constructs exist
around the Internet, including variants called MOO (MUD-Object-Oriented), MUSE
(Multiple-User Simulated Environment) and MUSH (where the "H" is for
"Hallucination"). Roughly speaking, these creations grow out of the old
Adventure game: they are virtual spaces constructed within computer memory,
having the same metaphoric spatiality as hypertexts. MUD users move through the
space by issuing commands. They may also manipulate objects and (most
importantly) conduct transactions with other users (Rheingold 145-75).
Aarseth's comparison of MUDs to the current generation of hypertext fictions
seems quite cogent. In many ways, MUDs deliver the same kind of textual
experience that hypertexts do. Any engagement with a MUD involves some level of
interactive writing, as the user describes actions and receives passages of
prose from the program in reply. In addition, the MOOs, MUSEs, and MUSHs allow
users to create new spaces, objects, and even simulated persons called "NPCs" or
"non-player characters," a term from role-playing games, which are an important
source for the MUD subculture. This creative franchise represents a significant
difference from the sort of hypertext that we have thus far considered. Works
like afternoon or The Madness of Roland do not allow their readers
to change the content or structure of the network -- though it is true that some
hypertexts, such as Bolter's electronic version of Writing Space and
McDaid's Funhouse, allow readers to write within the presentation space.
Deena Larsen's Marble Springs (Eastgate Systems, 1994) invites readers to
fill deliberate gaps in its story matrix, promising to include some of these
additions in subsequent editions. Even within hypertext, the lines are blurring;
but on the whole, literary hypertext keeps the roles of author and reader
distinct.
In an important early contribution to hypertext theory, Michael Joyce
proposed two different modes of interactive writing: "exploratory" and
"constructive" hypertext. Generally speaking, exploratory texts allow readers to
navigate through fixed bodies of material, while constructive texts represent
"structures for what does not yet exist," open-ended and contingent forms
("Siren Shapes" 10-12). In exploratory hypertext, the distinction between
primary author and subsequent reader-explorers remains clear. In constructive
hypertext, anyone is free to change the nature of the text. There can be many
authors, or perhaps it is more accurate to say that no author retains that
status absolutely. This account distorts Joyce's actual argument somewhat. In
fact his terms are more continuous than exclusive -- even most commercial
hypertexts retain some traces of constructive form. On the other hand, most
ventures in open, collaborative electronic writing betray some lingering
elements of authorial control; and this realization has considerable bearing on
the claims made for MUDs.
The writing environments Aarseth finds most valuable, UseNet newsgroups,
Internet Relay Chat lines, and Multiple-User Dimensions, closely resemble
Joyce's constructive ideal. In fact, since both news groups and MUDs allow the
linking of elements as "threads" or "rooms," they might qualify as constructive
hypertexts. Aarseth might also have mentioned other instances of hypertextual
writing distributed across the Internet, such as the World Wide Web and Wide
Area Information Server, which permit users to create documents whose links span
the entire global network (Krol 281-82). When Nelson first described hypertext
in the 1960s, he clearly had such constructive schemes in mind, not the limited,
exploratory writings that have recently had the limelight. If we remember this,
then Aarseth's point seems well taken. The "new writing" cannot have authors in
the old-fashioned sense. If hypertext and other forms electronic expression hold
out any difference, it would seem to lie with constructive ventures, not such
traditional offerings as electronic novels and monographs. The native country of
hypertext must be a stranger place than anything we have yet imagined.
If we take constructive hypertext as our ideal, however, how can we construct
a principle of resistance? In a writing environment without authors, there would
seem to be no check, at least in theory, on what Michel Foucault called the
"perilous" spread of discourse. It was to control such an explosion in language
that Foucault's "author-function" was called into being (216). If Aarseth is
correct in his claim that "the new writing" must be radically non-authoritative
and collaborative, then perhaps any struggle against the centrifugal force of
hypertext must fail. This would be consistent with the effect Kaplan and I have
noticed in our experiments with hypertextual criticism. Perhaps we should simply
learn to stop worrying and love the death of the author. Or if we do not wish to
surrender so easily, maybe we should redouble our scrutiny of so-called radical
electronic writing systems. After all, environments like UseNet, IRC, and the
MUDs do have discernible elements of structure. Many UseNet groups, for
instance, are managed by moderators who screen incoming material. There are
clear conventions for turn-taking, greeting, and departure on Internet Relay
Chat. We can even expect some level of coordination, if not deterministic
control, in Multi-User Dimensions.
As it happens, Aarseth's claim that MUDs and other Internet spaces represent
author-free zones cannot to be taken at face value -- and to be fair, Aarseth
offered this opinion not in formal writing but in the spontaneous give-and-take
of an electronic debate. The MUDs present many signs of the old authorial Adam.
In a recent visit to PMC-MOO, a multi-user space set up by the on-line journal
Postmodern Culture, one of my colleagues discovered how greatly the
demise of authorship has been exaggerated. Within ten minutes of logging on (in
a female persona), my informant had encountered sexism, bullying, and even
terrorism. First she was accosted by another user who insisted on addressing her
as "lady." Reminded that some women find this term objectionable, the user in
question replied that "there are only three kinds of females: ladies, babes, and
bitches." As this exchange devolved further, the garrulous user abruptly pulled
rank, claiming to have "wizard privileges" and then storming off into
cyberspace. My informant was initially puzzled by his last remark but soon
discovered its meaning. Shortly after the encounter with the digital ladies man,
she came across another user claiming to be a "terrorist." This person tossed
her a "bomb," which was actually a subprogram that moved her character to an
obscure room in the virtual space. She could not leave this room without
invoking another subprogram which required special privileges on the system.
These privileges are conferred only on "wizards," users who have access to the
coding facilities that underlie the MUD.
There would seem to be no fundamental difference between a MUD wizard and the
author of an exploratory hypertext. Both exert control over others' movements
through a virtual or symbolic space. Both exploit a power gradient within the
textual construct. Both represent a response to Coover's dilemma, the necessity
to limit the elliptical spread of networked discourse even as one struggles
against the monology of traditional writing. This is not to say that authors and
wizards are alike in all respects. There may of course be several wizards in a
MUD, just as there can be many authors in a distributed, constructive hypertext.
This multiplication of authorship can have important consequences, especially
when wizards find their interests in conflict. One wizard of my acquaintance
discovered that another programmer had begun to add rooms to "his" MUD, changing
the nature of social interactions there. In response he created a
self-replicating electronic object named kudzu, which quickly filled all the new
rooms -- and unfortunately the old ones as well. The MUD in question became
extinct.
Stories such as these shed a revealing light on our engagement with
hypertexts, virtual spaces, and other species of electronic writing. They
suggest, pace Aarseth, that the goal of our literary evolution is not to
abolish the author or to amputate her "motor parts." In these new textual
environments we may from time to time imagine that the author is "dead" --long
live the author-function, distributed and deconstructed but still very much with
us. Our new schemes for writing still invest power in managers of linguistic
structure -- albeit a mutable, transient, and contingent sort of power, given to
a class of users who do not map neatly onto any old-fashioned auteur. Any
principle of resistance for hypertext must acknowledge this transformation,
which Michael Joyce has recently named "the re-placement of the author." This
formulation offers an alternative both to Hardison's attack on hypertext
incunabula as the enemy of literature and to Aarseth's dismissal of exploratory
hypertext as a form of bourgeois reaction. Hypertext may come after "the end of
books" (whatever that means), but it is not quite the revolution that some fear
and others crave. Joyce insists that we place the author once again within the
text, and that we simultaneously re-place him in a context of difference:
Electronic text can never be completed; at best its closure maps
point on point until time is real and the text stays itself, becoming print.
But when a point suddenly fails to map onto itself the author is replaced.
Replacement of the author turns performer to author. The world intended by the
author is a place of encounter where we continually create the future as a
dissipative structure: the chance of oriented insertion becomes the moment of
structural instability, the interstitial link wherein we enact the replacement
of one writing by another. ("Re-Placing the Author")
In discussing the failure of a textual point to map onto itself Joyce draws
deeply on topology, dissipative systems, and other critiques of spatial
reasoning. It requires much more scope than we have here to do these concepts
justice. In fact the re-placement of the author is probably best addressed in
artistic practice, not theory. For our present critical purposes, it suffices to
note that the moment of replacement involves "structural instability," or to use
an idiom from computer science, breakdown. The author is placed into a
context of incompleteness, stress, and dis-closure. In this context or "place of
encounter," the author still operates intentionally, creating a little world, a
text or hypertext. But since that world is a performance space, allowing
multiple authors as well as readers to occupy the stage, we must understand the
author-function within a particular situation -- if not under erasure, then at
least in difficulties (see Douglas, "Where the Senses"). It is in this context
that we must understand the struggle for and the struggle against the line,
which between themselves constitute the dynamic of resistance in hypertext.
But again, practice seems more revealing here than theory. Before we can
approach these concepts in the abstract, it is necessary to consider some
particulars. Having re-placed the author within electronic writing, it follows
that we should glance at least tangentially at what some authors do in that
complicated space. This requires a digression.
3. Motor parts In trying to create a "new foundation" for the art of
software design, the cognitive scientists Terry Winograd and Fernando Flores
begin with the Heideggerian concept of "thrownness" or contingent
being-in-the-moment. The metaphor they use to introduce this concept involves a
traffic emergency: they invite the reader to imagine driving along a turnpike in
heavy rain and crowded traffic at 55 miles per hour. Into this situation comes a
large dog who runs in front of the car. The incident presents a problem in
analytical reasoning (it is drawn from a book called Decision Support
Systems), but it also implies something larger. "This driver," Winograd and
Flores note, "is an example par excellence of the thrownness that Heidegger
points out in our everyday life. We do not act as a result of consideration, but
as a way of being. The driver's reaction in this situation cannot be adequately
described in terms of rationality, even bounded rationality. His habits or his
experience of a prior accident may be much more important than any of his
concepts or evaluations of risk" (145-46). "Thrownness" furnishes a revealing
way of thinking about our relation to a world of automated and quasi-autonomous
technologies. The driver is indeed the definitive technological citizen. Though
we now learn that the "information superhighway" may turn out to be a digital
railroad (Lohr), there remains something fundamentally attractive about the
earlier metaphor. According to the science fiction writer Pat Cadigan, we are
living through the early days of an "Age of Fast Information" (26). We do indeed
seem thrown into this fast-paced milieu, without deliberation or option, and
with only minimal reaction time once we are up to speed.
We might reasonably suspect that hypertext, as an increasingly popular form
of writing on the Internet, is implicated in this Age of Fast Information.
Winograd and Flores's high-speed encounter might then tell us something about
our experience of hypertext. Indeed, the author of at least one electronic
manifesto has already taken up the trope of automotive mayhem. Consider this
prologue to the announced BLAM! Digital CD-ROM Magazine for the
Macintosh!! (Voyager Company, 1994):
These are the end times and we're playing in the streets! But do
you know what happens when you play with your back to the traffic? Hint: think
quick! BLAM! Are you just going to stand there and get run over? BLAM! is born
at the point of impact. You provide the meat, we provide the speed freaks, the
motor mavens, the gypsy cab drivers, the habitual drunks, the little old lady
from Pasadena, and other regulars on the DMV's most-wanted list. BLAM! will
manipulate you into colliding with explosive material. (Swenson)
This is perhaps a good place to stop digressing and return to hypertext and
its resistances. There is certainly plenty to resist in the above manifesto.
These may be "end times," but some of us learned a long time ago about playing
in the street. Many readers, no doubt, will not be pleased with Eric Swenson's
desire to run them down, treat them as "meat," or fling explosives, like those
bomb-throwing terrorists of the MUDs. Swenson's hyperventilating claims arouse a
strong impulse toward criticism in the root sense -- an attempt to cut this
discourse off from other, less Sadean approaches to electronic writing. However,
such inclinations carry the odor of bad faith. Swenson has one thing dead right:
hypertextual writing is indeed "born at the point of impact." Consider this
crucial moment in Monica Moran's Ambulance:
[In the print version, a graphic fromAmbulance appears here.
Copyright restrictions prevent its use on the Web.] At this point
we might reflect on an insight from McDaid's Funhouse, words of wisdom
delivered by one of Uncle Buddy's bandmates: "We have to explore the inner
realms Êof the mind and know how to shoot a good car chase" ("The Writer's
Brain," card 115). Car chases tend to involve collisions; and in such scenes,
the collisons often multiply. Moran's "instant of demolition" is repeated over
and over through much of the current generation of hypertext fiction. We have
already noticed the arresting proposition from Michael Joyce's afternoon,
"I want to say I may have seen my son die this morning." What the narrator
means, it develops, is that he has witnessed the aftermath of an encounter much
like the one above. Driving to work, he passes the wreck of a gray Buick that
looks exactly like his ex-wife's car. There are emergency vehicles on the scene
and two covered bodies. Much of the tension that animates afternoon, through
initial readings at least, flows from this fearsome discovery. Similarly, in
Uncle Buddy's Phantom Funhouse, one of the documents most deeply
concealed within the labyrinthine text is a newspaper clipping about a member of
Uncle Buddy's college band who dies when his car skids into a tree. Given its
positioning in the text and the way it completes certain patterns in the mosaic
of Buddy's life, this event might be crucial to the meaning of the story --
though such judgments are hard to make in a text without an overt narrative.
Nonetheless, if the car crash in the Funhouse does not hold the key to
that particular story, it does seem indicative of an emergent pattern in
hypertext writing as a whole. This brief survey might also include a fourth
text, J. Yellowlees Douglas's "I Have Said Nothing," which answers the question,
"What happens when a Chevy Nova with a 280 engine hits you going 75 miles per
hour?"
-- It fractures your collarbone, your scapula, your pelvis, your
sacral, lumbar, thoracic and cervical vertebrae. -- It splinters your
ribcage, compresses your liver, kidneys, spleen, stomach, intestines, lungs
and heart. -- It fractures your skull and bruises your brain. -- It
causes massive hemorrhaging, throws the heart into cardiac arrest, and throws
the central nervous system into profound shock. ("Anatomized")
Since Douglas, McDaid, and Joyce are all inmates of the "Eastgate School," we
might explain their obsessions as variations on a theme, or a kind of
eastern-urban mass hysteria. However, this rationale will not account for Eric
Swenson's interest in the "point of impact" or Monica Moran's attraction to the
"moment of impact" -- nor, for that matter, Albert Gore's curious notion that
electronic networks can be mapped onto the Interstate Highway System. There
seems to be something convergent about these delusions. The particular
"thrownness" of which Douglas speaks -- the jolting of the victim into "profound
shock" -- might be read less as an obsession and more as a signature of the
hypertextual effect. "Profound shock" could describe the conditions from which
these texts emerge as well as the effect they address, and perhaps aim to
reproduce. Hypertext may be a technology of trauma, reflexively figuring its own
assault on the textual corpus in terms of insults to the physical body. Perhaps
Sterling's 21st-century cynic is right to call hypertext a stupidity drug for
smart people. We might want to say that like speed, hypertext kills. In fact
George Landow actually says precisely this when he describes incunabular
hypertext. According to Landow, the individual component or "lexia" in such a
text "associates with whatever text links to it, thereby dissolving notions of
the intellectual separation of one text from others in the way that some
chemicals destroy the cell membrane of an organism: destroying the cell membrane
destroys the cell: it kills" (53). At least this description has no screeching
rubber or high-speed impacts -- but it is not a pretty picture.
If hypertext really "kills" the text, then those who care about literature
might justifiably condemn it. And yet the implications of such a position are
problematic. Refusing to look at the crash site does not undo the accident.
Declining to drive, while a fine civic gesture, cannot really insulate us from
the horrors of the superhighways, electronic or otherwise. After celebrating the
death of the traditional text, Landow offers a justification: "destroying
now-conventional notions of textual separation may destroy certain attitudes
associated with text, but it will not necessarily destroy text. It will,
however, reconfigure it and our expectations of it" (53). Whether we like it or
not, we must come to terms with this reconfiguration, or in Joyce's terms, the
"re-placement of the author." But first we must revise our expectations. Surely
no attempt at reconciliation can be wholly successful here. This is why Coover
predicts struggle and on-line "wars." There will always be an impulse to reject
the violence of the crash, to restore the broken dignity of writing, or to haul
the sullied body of the author out of the collaborative MUD. We could dwell on
this restorative impulse in its own right, but that is not a very good way to
reach a principle of constructive resistance. To move beyond "profound shock"
and simple denial, we need to understand that there is something paradoxical
about the crash scene. At least on the metaphorical plane, some so-called
accidents are not so accidental. By the same token some crashes, though
evidently destructive, may actually create new order.
4. Driving in the breakdown lane To unravel these apparent
contradictions, we need once again to invoke the concept of breakdown. Like
"thrownness," this idea comes out of Winograd and Flores's encounter with
phenomenology. "Following Heidegger," they write, "we prefer to talk about
'breakdowns.' By this we mean the interrupted moment of our habitual, standard,
comfortable 'being-in-the-world.' Breakdowns serve an extremely important
cognitive function, revealing to us the nature of our practices and equipment,
making them 'present-to-hand' to us, perhaps for the first time. In this sense
they function in a positive rather than a negative way" (77-78). Winograd and
Flores use breakdown as a fulcrum for their efforts to shift the ground of
software design. Dismayed by claims of strong-AI proponents such as Roger Schank
that computer programs can have actual knowledge, Winograd and Flores point out
that understanding cannot be captured in representations and scripts. These
structures can never be sufficiently comprehensive. There will always be crucial
gaps, leading to moments of failure. "New design," Winograd and Flores argue,
"can be created and implemented only in the space that emerges in the recurrent
structure of breakdown. A design constitutes an interpretation of breakdown and
a committed attempt to anticipate future breakdowns" (78).
Unfortunately, not all designers understand or honor this commitment, which
is why Winograd and Flores offer their critique. Drawing not just on
phenomenology, but also on the biophysics of Humberto Maturana and the
speech-act theory of John Searle, they argue for a deeply contextual view of the
world in which structures of meaning spread in an indefinite web of associations
--a model, we might note, that recurs in the poststructuralist concept of le
texte, in De Landa's "machinic phylum," in Nelson's or Landow's descriptions of
hypertext, in Joyce's notion of "a structure for what does not yet exist," and
in the World Wide Web itself. The complexity of this network defies simple
calculation; or to use the idiom of cognitive science, "decision space" has no
precise boundaries. Therefore attempts to link cognition to the tools of
technology must always encounter (or engender) breakdown. Winograd and Flores
cite many instances of this effect, the most striking involving Joseph
Weizenbaum's program ELIZA, which mimics the discourse of a psychotherapist.
ELIZA does not contain a formal representation of therapeutic knowledge; in
essence the program consists of a very clever set of language tricks. Given
input of a certain form, ELIZA commonly responds with a simple modification of
that input. So when ELIZA encounters a construction of the form, I am [verb
phrase], it may respond with the construction, How long have you been [verb
phrase]? Herein lies a fatal weakness. One of ELIZA's interlocutors made the
claim, "I am swallowing poison" (121). ELIZA's response ("How long have you been
swallowing poison?") may represent a fine piece of satire, but the program is
supposed to be a therapist, not a satirist. This instance nicely defines the
phenomenology of breakdown.
By drawing on breakdown as a criterion for technological design, we may be
able to frame a principle of resistance for hypertext. There does seem to be a
strong thematic coincidence among the superhighway metaphor, Winograd and
Flores's automotive description of "thrownness," and hypertext fiction's
obsession with crash scenes. Perhaps these coincidences stem merely from what
Thomas Pynchon calls "our front-brain faith in Kute Korrespondences"
(Gravity's Rainbow 590) -- which is to say, perhaps they are not very
meaningful in themselves. Yet they may point symptomatically to a more
significant perturbation of the cognitive field. Breakdown seems as good a name
as any for this primary disturbance. If we are drawn to images of fast transit
and hurtling machinery partly because they represent our not-so-oriented
insertion, or our "thrownness" into the Age of Fast Information, then perhaps we
should see where the Korrespondences lead. We might theorize that we are
obsessed with the image of the crash, particularly in interactive text, because
it points to the inevitable outcome of our mad futurity. If Winograd and Flores
are right, technology evolves only through the experience of breakdown. There
must be Roger Schanks and ELIZAs in the world, and they must make their
audacious claims, which must contain serious errors which lead to mortifying
practical failures. At the same time, we recognize these errors, coming to
understand our technological systems as fundamentally -- even positively --
unreliable.
This last insight might be our principle of resistance. Hypertext fictions
are rife with collision, impact, and the scattering of "motor parts" all over
the imaginary roadway. Perhaps these images are so pervasive precisely because
hypertext fiction enacts and incorporates the principle of breakdown. Much like
Weizenbaum's ELIZA, Joyce's afternoon or Moran's Ambulance or my
own Victory Garden implicitly claim multiplicity, or at least "a semantic
richness of data storage comparable to that found in expert systems." The
hypertext pretends to be a mental world made cunningly. In his introduction to
afternoon, Joyce claims that in his text "we match minds" ("in my mind").
But as Terence Harpold has observed, this putative encounter more often than not
turns out to be a mismatch, an instance of wandering or error in the deepest
sense (132). Even (or especially) under "re-placement," the hypertext author
cannot know how his work will resonate against the particular "thrownness" of a
given reader. A reader who chooses the yield word "die" in afternoon may be
dismayed to find that the connections running through her mind (the die is cast;
Un coup de dés; dies irae) are not realized at the point of arrival, which
simply describes a car wreck. The link in this sense is usually -- or always, at
some level of abstraction -- a detour (Harpold 129). No doubt something of this
sort happens in conventional writing as well, but books do not entail the same
"oriented insertion" as electronic texts. At any and perhaps every interstice in
a hypertext, the technological situation opens itself to breakdown. To read
these texts is to encounter, in series and at depth, the same deconstruction of
authority that takes place between ELIZA and the self-described suicide. The
program does not answer our expectations. It violates our sense of commitment,
at least to the extent that this is defined in terms of what Joyce calls a
"selfish interaction," or an assumption that the story really does exist to
please us ("Selfish Interactions" 80-81). Breakdowns always teach us something.
In this case we learn that there is an author here after all, and an egotistical
and opinionated one at that, making hypertext fiction look like a true shoot off
the Shandean tree.
The term "deconstruction" is not used idly here. There is a self-revising
double logic inherent in the fiction of interaction that underlies interactive
fiction. Its principles may be asserted only under the mark of their own
erasure. The author is present but re-placed. The promised but frustrated
multiplicity of exploratory hypertext opens inevitably into the seductive
possibilities of the Internet and constructive hypertext. Displeased by the
backslidings of the Eastgate School, some will sprawl in the MUD's much mire, as
Robert Browning might have said. Principles of randomness and infinitely
expansive story lines beckon -- and so we come back to the point at which this
essay began: Robert Coover's forecast of a contentious future for electronic
writing. We have been trying to evolve a resistance which will both endorse and
oppose the essential promiscuity of hypertext (taking that term in all
its senses). The concept of breakdown seems to help in this, though something
more needs to be said about how breakdown may be applied in electronic reading
and writing. An initial reader of this essay objected that concentrating on
breakdown as a limit to multiplicity slights the "pleasure of the web," or the
moment of "precipitation" in which a contingent order manifests itself from the
chaos of possibilities, particularly in open-ended texts like Marble
Springs ("Reader's report"). The point is well taken and must be
acknowledged as a serious limit on the claims made here. Hypertextual breakdown
should not signify a compromise with the line but a continuation of struggle.
The pleasures of the web are real, but they are also fragile.
This fragility -- both the effect and the cause of breakdown -- will always
be an enduring feature of the landscape. "Hypertextual story space is now
multidimensional and theoretically infinite," Scott Bukatman quotes Coover,
finding the remark provocative. "The phrase 'theoretically infinite' raises
another question: the lack of closure may be a theoretical strength but a
practical weakness. Landow concedes that 'complete hypertextuality requires
gigantic information networks' linked more tightly than existing networks. A
'complete' hypertext, like the perfect simulation promised by virtual reality,
remains a kind of electronic grail" (Bukatman 13). Like the argument for the
"pleasure of the web," this is an important objection. One could adduce
Gravity's Rainbow as evidence of what happened to grail quests in the
sixties, but that would be another story. Suffice it to say that we no longer
expect to arrive at the Holy Center, though we may well come in the fullness of
time to the Dark Tower or some other scene of success-through-failure. Anyone
who understands the ways of native hypertext knows that the point is not to
struggle against hypertext. Rather the act of reading in hypertext is
constituted as struggle: a chapter of chances, a chain of detours, a
series of revealing failures in commitment out of which come the pleasures of
the text. We must understand hypertext as an information highway in which every
lane is reserved for breakdowns, a demolition epic in which the vehicles always
and constantly blow apart. Some of us may not be interested in a "complete"
hypertext -- indeed certainly not in a "complete" evocation of virtual reality
or any other technological "enframing." As Michael Heim pointed out some time
ago, we must worry about the tendency toward monolithic drift (or "digital
convergence") tending toward "an all-enframing technology... which points to the
reduction of the metaphorical powers of language to a single aspect of
information management" (72). Give us this day our daily breakdown, rather than
such sinister forms of success.
Afterword In this essay, I owe much to two of my
colleagues. In the summer of 1993, Terence Harpold suggested to me that J.G.
Ballard's Crash might have some bearing on the narrative aesthetics of
hypertext. J. Yellowlees Douglas's, "I Have Said Nothing," which I first read
that spring, strongly confirmed that insight.
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